If those numerous developing countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are to become constructively engaged in this next attempt to liberalize trade multilaterally, they need to be convinced that there will be sufficient gains from trade reform to warrant the inevitable costs of negotiation and adjustment. To that end, this paper provides new estimates of the likely economic effects on their economies of further liberalizing world trade after Uruguay Round implementation is completed.
The paper begins by describing briefly the global economy-wide model known as GTAP, and then using it to provide two base projections of the world economy in 2005 . By that time all Uruguay Round commitments are scheduled to be fully implemented, and most of the commitments made by China and Taiwan in their WTO accession negotiations will have been implemented. It is also the nominated date for concluding this next round of negotiations. The first base projection assumes that none of the Uruguay Round commitments are implemented, while the second assumes all are fully implemented and China joins the WTO. The comparison between these two scenarios gives a sense of the size of the contribution to structural change that is generated by economic growth generally as compared with trade policy reform in particular.
Having established that second 2005 projection of the global economy, we then use the GTAP model to examine the consequences of removing the distortions to merchandise trade that will still be in place in 2005 post-Uruguay Round. We know from documentation at the WTO (2001a) and from recent GTAP modelling efforts that there will still be much to gain globally from further reform. The effects are considered first without and then with South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa taking part.
The purpose of the comparison between those two scenarios is to show the extent to which the economic benefits to those poor countries from the next WTO round depends on their own as distinct from other regions' liberalizations.
The final part of the paper discusses the limitations of the GTAP model in capturing all the gains from trade, and draws out implications for South Asia and SubSaharan African policy makers.
The global, economy-wide GTAP model and database
To examine the potential effects of trade liberalizations on South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries, use is made of the projections version of the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) applied general equilibrium model based in Purdue University (Hertel 1997 ). The GTAP model is a standard, multi-region model that is currently in use by several hundred researchers in scores of countries on five continents.
The Version 4 data base builds on contributions from many of these individuals, as well as the national and international agencies in the GTAP Consortium (McDougall, Elbehri and Truoung 1998). Perfect competition and constant returns to scale are assumed for all sectors of each economy in the version used here (but see qualifications in the final section of the paper).
The model utilizes a sophisticated representation of consumer demands that allows for differences in both the price and income responsiveness of demand in different regions depending upon both the level of development of the region and the particular consumption patterns observed in that region.
On the supply-side, differences in rates of factor accumulation within and between countries interact with different sectoral factor intensities to drive Rybczynskitype changes in the sectoral composition of output. The GTAP production system distinguishes sectors by their intensities in four primary factors of production: agricultural land, labour time, physical capital, and human capital. Thus in a region where physical capital is accumulating rapidly, relative to other factors, we can expect the capital intensive sectors to expand at the expense of labour-intensive sectors.
The GTAP framework is built on a complete set of economic accounts for 1995 for each of 45 economies/regions spanning the world (see McDougall et al. 1998 ). It incorporates an exhaustive description of inter-industry linkages between the 50 sectors in the model. In addition to differences in intermediate input intensities, import intensities are also permitted to vary across uses. Since much trade is in intermediate inputs, the distinction between sales to final consumers and sales to other firms can be quite important. Lowering the cost of imported goods to consumers is quite different from lowering the cost of intermediate inputs to domestic firms that may be competing with imports in the final product market.
As well, products are differentiated by place of production. The linkage between the different prices of a product is typically quite strong, but will depend on the degree of substitutability in consumption. In addition to matching up more effectively with reality, this approach has the advantage of permitting bilateral trade to be tracked, as opposed to simply reporting total exports net of imports.
Since it is cumbersome to conduct and present projections with the full 50-sector, 45-region GTAP data base, the present results have been aggregated up to a level which highlights sectors and countries of interest for this particular study.
Unfortunately, the regional aggregation in GTAP allows only the very largest IOR economies to be shown separately. The model is solved with GEMPACK software, described in Harrison and Pearson (1996) .
Projecting the post-Uruguay Round world economy to 2005
Version 4 of the GTAP model's data base is for 1995, the beginning of the Uruguay Round's implementation. Using estimates of the tariffs in place at the start and conclusion of Uruguay Round implementation (Table 1 ) and projections of growth in factor endowments, productivity and population to 2005 (based mainly on World Bank numbers --see Table 2 ), it is possible for the GTAP model to project the world's economies forward. Table 3 summarizes the results of such a base-case projection scenario for 2005 on output in developing and other economies, from which a number of points can be made.
[insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 near here] First, non-trivial structural changes necessarily accompany different rates of expansion in (a) relative factor endowments and productivities and (b) incomes as economies grow. In general, the growth of agricultural and other primary product output is slower than that for manufactures and services in virtually all countries.
Second, outputs of all sectors tend to grow slower in slower-growing economies. This is a direct result of the home bias that is so prevalent in every nation's economy: foreign products, even of fairly homogeneous items such as cereals, are an imperfect substitute for the domestically produced item because of such things as nationalistic preferences and transport costs. Hence relatively rapidly growing China is projected to increase its output of agricultural goods over the decade to 2005 at a faster rate than South Asia (whose economies are projected to grow slower than China's).
Third, the proportional changes over the decade are very similar in the two scenarios (compare Tables 3(a) and 3(b)). This is a crucial point that is often not appreciated. The point is that as major as the Uruguay Round is, the impact of its decade-long implementation on the structure of the world's economies is small relative to the impact of normal market forces that accompany economic growth over such a longish period. Fifth, notice that the service sector's expansion is shown to be not very different under the two scenarios in proportional terms (although in dollar terms that huge sector would be significantly bigger under freer trade). This is because we assume, like most of our predecessor modellers, that the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) will deliver no significant reforms by 2004.
[insert Table 4 near here]
Changes in consumption also accompany economic growth and policy reforms, and it is the difference between them and the production changes that determine the changes in sectoral trade balances. The latter can be summarized in terms of the self sufficiency ratio (the ratio of production over consumption), as shown in Table 4 , where it should be kept in mind that the sum of the sectoral trade balance changes is set exogenously by the modellers at zero (that is, no running up or running down the aggregate balance of trade over time). What Table 4 reveals is a remarkable degree of stability as between the two projection scenarios for developing countries. The implementation of the Uruguay Round is not projected to cause major changes in agricultural self-sufficiency, for example. In fact the only significant differences between the scenarios are in manufactures: South Asia will specialize more in textiles and clothing and less in other manufactures because of the Uruguay Round, while Sub-Saharan Africa will specialize more in primary products and less in industrial goods.
Effects of removing remaining distortions to goods trade in 2005
Having established the post-Uruguay Round base-case projection scenario for [insert Table 5 near here]
The first point to note is that South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa would have to undertake some structural changes within and between key sectors even if they chose not to join in such a trade reform (Table 5( Table 1 ) are more severe than Sub-Saharan Africa's. When South Africa is disaggregated from Other Sub-Saharan Africa, however, then as shown in Table 8 It is thus in the national economic interest of such countries to be pressured from abroad to commit to such reform, painful though that may be politically for its government. The political pain tends to be less, and the prospect for a net economic gain greater, the more sectors the country involves in the reform. The economic gain is prospectively greater the more sectors it involves because a wider net reduces the possibility that reform is confined to a subset of sectors that are not the most distorted.
In the latter case, resources might move from the reformed sector to even more inefficient uses, thereby reducing rather than improving the efficiency of national resource use.
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Notice that other parts of the world gain a little more when all regions participate, in their case because of improved terms of trade when South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa take part.
Qualifications and policy implications
Of course net national economic welfare is not the only criterion that drives governments to act as they do. Indeed until recently, it may not have been even a major one. However, it is steadily becoming more dominant, for at least three reasons.
One is the rapid globalization of the world that technological and economic policy changes have stimulated over the past decade or so, a major effect of which is that economies will be penalized ever-more rapidly and severely through capital flight for bad economic governance.
Another reason is the broader mandate of the WTO, which makes it easier now than before the Uruguay Round for developing countries to engage profitably in cross-sectoral exchange of market access commitments, including in services trade.
A third reason is that it is becoming better understood that there are three other important source of gains from trade reform that are not captured in the above results, namely, gains from reform to trade in services, gains from increasing competition and economies of scale, and dynamic gains.
While measuring distortions to services trade and mark-ups by imperfectly competitive firms is fraught with difficulty, initial attempts are beginning to bear fruit.
A new study by includes one set of estimates of the tariff equivalent of those distortions in a version of the GTAP model that also incorporates imperfect competition. Specifically, that study assumes monopolistic competition exists in the non-primary sectors involving economies of scale that are internal to each firm. These modifications amplify the estimated gains from trade considerably. For example, that study finds that if applied tariff rates for both goods and services were to be cut in half, the global gains would be US$385 billion, of which 51 per cent would be due to services reform. The 49 per cent due to halving tariffs on goods trade ($192 billion) in the Francois study compares with the estimate reported in Table 8 (where no imperfect competition is assumed) of $257 billion from totally removing all tariffs on merchandise trade. The distribution of those gains to the developing countries focused on in our study is very similar to that reported in Table 8 : about 3 per cent is attributed to India and 2 per cent to Sub-Saharan Africa.
The key point to draw from this comparison is that the gains from trade reported in the previous section should be interpreted as lower-bound estimates for at least two reasons: because they apply only to goods trade, leaving aside the important distortions prevalent in services markets; and because they are based on the assumption that there are no economies of scale and that perfect competition prevails in all sectors.
Both aspects of this point are especially important for Sub-Saharan Africa.
With respect to policies at home they are important partly because that region has among the highest barriers to services trade , Table C .2), and partly because the region's national economies are small and hence those services trade barriers translate into a high degree of monopolistic activity and diseconomies of small scale.
With respect to policies abroad, this point is perhaps even more important for Sub-Saharan Africa, especially as it applies to ocean shipping. Two-thirds of SubSaharan African exports are primary products. Most of them are being shipped in bulky unprocessed or semi-processed form. The region's export earnings are thus affected significantly by the cost of ocean shipping services. That service sector is characterised by a high degree of oligopolistic activity on the part of ship owners, virtually all of whom are developed country firms. While ever that service sector remains restrictive, the benefits of freer trade will be captured in part by the cartel of shipowners who can charge a higher mark-up above their marginal costs as import tariffs on goods are lowered.
To illustrate this last point, a recent empirical study was undertaken by Francois and Wooten (2000) . They estimate that, depending on the degree of collusion, shippers could absorb for themselves, in the form of higher mark-ups, up to half the gains that exporters would otherwise enjoy from goods trade liberalization if only shipping was a competitive service activity. The clear conclusion to draw from the Francois/Wooten study is that liberalizing trade in maritime services under GATS is likely to boost substantially the gains from merchandise trade reform and especially reform of bulky commodities such as agricultural products.
None of the studies reported above draw on a truly dynamic economic model. They measure well the effects of producers reallocating their resources and consumers adjusting their purchases when relative product prices change with trade reform, but they do not measure the impact of such reform on investment behaviour. Yet we know from experience that when markets are freed up, investors divert their funds towards expanding the now-more-profitable activities and away from the now-lessprofitable ones, and are willing to invest more in aggregate. That applies between countries as well as within them, especially following the reductions in barriers to foreign investment and hence international technology transfers over the past two decades. Economic growth is boosted by that diversion and expansion of investment funds, over and above the boost in output from reallocating existing resource endowments.
This additional effect is omitted from most empirical modelling efforts for two reasons: partly because it takes much longer for analysts to build and to run dynamic models than comparative static ones, and partly because the extent to which investors respond to changing incentives is less well understood and hence cannot be included with as much certainty as the other behavioural characteristics that are common to both comparative static and dynamic models. Keeping that in mind, it is nonetheless instructive to note the results of a recent study that examined the range of outcomes generated as the responsiveness of productivity to openness is varied. Source: Authors' model results. 
